The Suspension Mounts

Mezey v South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust

In certain circumstances, an employee can ask a court for an injunction to restrain their employers from breaching their contract (instead of asking for damages). Up until now, however, these were only granted to restrain an employer from dismissing their employee.

In Mezey v South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust, the Court of Appeal said there was no reason why injunctions could not also be given to restrain an employer from suspending their employee.

Basic facts

Dr Mezey was a consultant psychiatrist for the Trust, based at Springfield Hospital. She also held an academic post at St George’s Hospital Medical School. One of her hospital patients was a paranoid schizophrenic who killed a man in September 2004.

Dr Mezey was subsequently criticised for her management of the patient in two internal inquiries set up by the Trust. No steps were taken against her although the Trust told her in August 2005 that it would take disciplinary proceedings against her, scheduled to start in early 2007.

However, after a further independent inquiry report was published in 2006, she agreed to do only non-clinical work. A few weeks later (November 2006), she was asked to a more formal meeting and told that she was being suspended from all her duties, both clinical and academic.

Dr Mezey said the Trust had no right to suspend her from her non-clinical work and asked the High Court to issue an injunction preventing it from doing so, on the basis that it was a breach of her contract.

High Court decision

The High Court agreed that the Trust's decision to suspend Dr Mezey from all her duties was a breach of contract. It also said that the Trust was contractually obliged to follow advice published by the Department of Health, which said that suspension was a policy of last resort, that it should be for as short a time as possible and that partial suspension was preferable.

It therefore granted an interim injunction, allowing Dr Mezey to continue her non-clinical duties. It accepted that “although such an order would be unprecedented, it did not raise any question of principle different from that raised by the cases in which the court has been prepared to restrain dismissals in breach of contractual procedures.”

The Trust asked the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the decision. It argued that although it was perfectly acceptable for the court to restrain a dismissal, suspension was different because it was simply “'a neutral act preserving the employment relationship”.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Trust. It said that, at least in relation to professionals with vocational jobs, “suspension changes the status quo from work to no work and it inevitably casts a shadow over the employee's competence. Of course this does not mean that it cannot be done, but it is not a neutral act.”

It said there was “no reason of principle” why a court should not have the power to put a suspension on hold, in the same way as it could with a dismissal. Both were potential breaches of contract, “the one no doubt more fundamental than the other, and each is capable of not being fully compensable in damages.”
It therefore refused the Trust leave to appeal.